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Conciliationism and Fictionalism 
MARCUS WILLIAM HUNT1 
ABSTRACT: This paper offers fictionalism as a new approach to the problem of reasonable 
disagreement discussed in social epistemology. The conciliationist approach to reasonable 
disagreement is defined, and three problems with it are posed: that it is destructive of 
inquiry, self-defeating, and unacceptably revisionary. Hans Vaihinger’s account of fic-
tions is explained, and it is shown that if the intellectual commitments that are the subject 
of reasonable disagreements are treated as fictions rather than as beliefs, the three noted 
problems are avoided. Whereas beliefs have a “rivalrous” relation to the source of their 
justification (evidence), fictions have a non-rivalrous relation to the source of their justi-
fication (expediency), meaning that disagreement over which fictions to employ is not 
problematic in the way that disagreement over what to believe is. Some objections to the 
fictionalist approach to reasonable disagreement are answered.  
KEYWORDS: Conciliationism – disagreement – fictionalism – pessimistic induction – 
social epistemology – Hans Vaihinger. 
 
0. Introduction 
 In this essay I address three criticisms regarding the consequences of the 
conciliationist approach to disagreement; that conciliationism is destructive 
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of inquiry, self-defeating, and unacceptably revisionary. Although I endorse 
the doxastic revision that conciliationism suggests, my intention in this pa-
per is not to defend conciliationism, but rather to draw a new approach 
toward reasonable disagreement from the examination of these three criti-
cisms. I suggest that the doxastic revision which conciliationism requires 
of us is consistent with our maintaining a propositional attitude other than 
belief towards our intellectual commitments. I suggest that we ought to re-
late to them as fictions, and that doing so avoids the three noted criticisms. 
In part one I briefly state what I take conciliationism to be. In part two I 
explain the three criticisms of conciliationism. In part three I explain Hans 
Vaihinger’s account of fictions. In part four I show how fictionalization of 
our intellectual commitments avoids the three criticisms. In part five I state 
and respond to five objections to my suggestion.  
1. Specifying conciliationism 
 “Conciliationism” and “the steadfast view” are the two approaches to 
the question of the extent to which doxastic revision is rational for the dis-
putants of a reasonable disagreement. The former calls for substantial dox-
astic revision, and the latter calls for little or no doxastic revision. One way 
of stating the insight of conciliationism is that in cases of reasonable disa-
greement one is provided with second order evidence which weighs against 
the first order evidence one holds for one’s belief or undercuts this evi-
dence.  
 On conciliationism, not all disagreements give us reason for revising 
our beliefs, only reasonable disagreements do. For there to be a reasonable 
disagreement, the disputants must be epistemic peers. Epistemic peers are 
those who meet these two conditions:  
 “(i) they are equals with respect to their familiarity with the evidence 
and arguments which bear on that question, and 
(ii) they are equals with respect to general epistemic virtues such as 
intelligence, thoughtfulness, and freedom from bias” (Kelly 2005, 175). 
I will make two controversial assertions about these conditions which al-
low conciliationism to apply to many of our real-world disagreements,  
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rather than remaining a doctrine that applies only to model cases of disa-
greement in which we merely stipulate that (i) and (ii) obtain. 
 First, “equal” need not mean “same.” To say that two disputants are 
epistemic peers with respect to (i) and (ii) is not to say that they have the 
very same evidence or epistemic virtues. If sameness of (i) and (ii) is re-
quired for a reasonable disagreement, then it seems unlikely that anyone 
has ever had a reasonable disagreement, given the uniqueness of every in-
dividual’s life experiences (King 2012). But real-world disagreements are, 
surely, sometimes reasonable disagreements. So, a conception of “equal” 
other than sameness should be adopted. I suggest a dialectical understand-
ing of “equal.” That is, so long as the disagreement of the two disputants 
could not (counterfactually) be resolved by a mutual disclosure of their 
various dissimilarities, there is a reasonable disagreement. The extra tidbit 
of evidence that disputant A has only makes A and B not peers if this evi-
dence ought to significantly change the beliefs of disputant B if it were 
disclosed to B. That A has reviewed 1001 case studies and B has reviewed 
1000 case studies does not make A and B non-peers, nor does that A is a 
little more open minded whilst B is a little more attentive.  
 Second, note that the definition of “epistemic peers” offered is meta-
physical. Yet, as an epistemological matter, in a given real-world disagree-
ment we are often not quite sure whether the disputants are epistemic peers 
or not. In real-world disagreements we are often locked in “apparently” 
reasonable disagreements, where it seems that both (i) and (ii) may well 
obtain. It seems that we have grounds for some degree of doxastic revision 
not only when we know that (i) and (ii) obtain, but so far as it seems they 
may obtain. Where the disagreement is clearly attributable to a lack of ev-
idence or failure of reason in one party, the disagreement gives one no 
grounds for revising one’s beliefs, but where the disagreement cannot be 
attributed to such factors, the hypothesis that the disagreement is a reason-
able one remains plausible and provides grounds for some degree of dox-
astic revision.  
2. Three criticisms of conciliationism 
 I now turn to stating the three objections to conciliationism that I wish 
to address.  
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2.1. Pessimistic induction 
 The first criticism is that the doxastic revision advised by conciliation-
ism, even though epistemically required, would put an end to much intel-
lectual inquiry. As a conciliationist, one finds oneself in a somewhat exotic 
form of the pessimistic induction problem (Laudan 1981) that counsels 
against belief in the theoretical entities posited by contemporary science, 
that is, against scientific realism. Surveying the history of philosophy or 
social science one would find, on the characterization of epistemic peer-
hood I have offered, that most of the disputant’s disagreements were ap-
parently reasonable disagreements. Therefore, the peers to these disagree-
ments ought to have conciliated and become adoxic (rather than maintain-
ing, for example, nominalism and realism, Keynesianism and monetarism). 
Likewise, one finds oneself in apparently reasonable disagreements, in 
many cases over the same or similar matters as past thinkers. Therefore, by 
induction one has good reason to believe that in 30 years, when the next 
iteration of philosophy and social science has emerged, one will again find 
oneself in apparently reasonable disagreements about the same or similar 
questions – again requiring conciliation. Therefore, one reasonably antici-
pates never having justified beliefs about these matters. If one’s end in phi-
losophizing is to hold justified beliefs about philosophical matters (or to 
hold any other type of mind-to-world direction of fit propositional attitude 
that is sensitive to evidence), then by ought implies can one should not 
bother philosophizing. One should become dispirited with philosophizing, 
and go to tend the garden, or some activity about which one can reasonably 
anticipate a decent chance of success. Note that this pessimistic induction 
is more severe than the one facing scientific realism, since there is at least 
some chance that present scientific theories will not succumb to the same 
fate as those of the past (being superseded) whereas in this case we know 
that the problem (apparently reasonable disagreement) already obtains for 
our present beliefs. Likewise, the various strategies for defending scientific 
realism, such as selective realism (Hardin & Rosenberg 1982; Psillos 
1999), entity realism (Cartwright 1983; Hacking 1982), structural realism 
(Worrall 1989), or claiming that the scientific theories of the present are 
“more successful” than those of the past or in some way qualitatively differ-
ent (Fahrbach 2011), seem hard to replicate vis-à-vis philosophical and so-
cial scientific theories or to not really admit of analogues at all.  
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2.2. Self-defeat 
 Conciliationism has been charged with being self-defeating (Christen-
sen 2009, 762; Plantinga 1995). Conciliationists recommend substantial 
doxastic revision in the light of apparently reasonable disagreement. Stead-
fasters instead recommend little or no doxastic revision in the light of an 
apparently reasonable disagreement. Plausibly, steadfasters are in an ap-
parently reasonable disagreement with conciliationists. According to con-
ciliationism this demands that one undergo a substantial doxastic revision 
away from conciliationism. This effect can be iterated ad infinitum in very 
messy and contradictory directions, e.g. “Cynthia conciliationist” concili-
ates with the steadfaster to some intermediate position, but in turn meets 
“Cal conciliationist” who thinks he has a special reason not to conciliate 
with the steadfaster. It appears to Cynthia that she is in an apparently rea-
sonable disagreement with Cal, so she conciliates closer to the original con-
ciliationist position. In a world of recursive debates, maintaining the sort 
of “50:50” adoxicism typically suggested by conciliationism would rarely 
be justified. 
2.3. Revisionary 
 Conciliationism seems too revisionary and counter-intuitive. We can 
imagine the case of a philosopher who has spent many decades carving out 
theories, and has many intuitions, about various matters: the immorality of 
abortion, the truth of pansychism, etc. Then they hear about conciliation-
ism, find it to be convincing, and now have to abandon their many beliefs. 
From a reflective-equilibrium point of view, conciliationism is a case of 
the tail wagging the dog. If one must weigh one’s theories and intuitions 
about all these other matters against one’s theories and intuitions about the 
epistemology of disagreement, this latter must lose out.  
3. Fictions 
 In The Philosophy of “As If” Vaihinger distinguishes between two types 
of ideation; hypothesis and fiction. Typically, we are under the impression 
that all of our intellectual commitments fall under the former category. 
Opinion, belief, and knowledge may be counted under the umbrella of  
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“hypothesis” because they share that they are intended to correspond to the 
world. Vaihinger’s claim is that some of our intellectual commitments are 
not of this kind. Rather, there is a class of ideations called fictions which 
may be characterized as “products of the imaginative faculty” (Vaihinger 
1935, 63). These are not intended as claims about reality, and are “ad-
vanced with the consciousness that [they are] an inadequate, subjective and 
pictorial manner of conception, whose coincidence with reality is, from the 
start, excluded” (Vaihinger 1935, 268). According to Vaihinger, fictions 
are representations which are known to be false or impossible. They induce 
us to think as if something that is the case were not the case, or as if some-
thing which is not the case were the case. The reason we should be inter-
ested in entertaining such ideations is that doing so proves to be useful in 
the wider process of theorizing or in practical activity. Despite their falsity, 
fictions “remain from a practical standpoint necessary elements in our 
thought” (Vaihinger 1935, 134). Therefore, whereas the justification for a 
hypothesis is evidence, the justification for a fiction is its expediency. Ex-
pediency here I will characterize loosely as that which aims at any good 
not immediately and narrowly concerned with corresponding to reality in 
the way that “hypothesis” is; guiding action, organizing thought, generat-
ing new hypotheses, regulating emotions.  
 According to Vaihinger, fictions play a role in many aspects of our in-
tellectual and practical lives. I will mention a few examples for the pur-
poses of illustration. In economics we create models which could never 
obtain in reality; a market in which there is perfect information, homoge-
neous products, no barriers to entry or exit, etc. Similarly, we may think 
about impossible utopias to help draw normative conclusions about what 
we should do. To the same end we might try to reason as if we were behind 
a veil of ignorance (Rawls 1999, 118-123). I may try to think about some 
matter as if I were you. We may import analogies from one field of thought 
to another; we may think about society as if it were an organism or a family, 
or about economic competition as if it were a process of Darwinian evolu-
tion. We may instruct a jury to deliberate as if they did not know a piece of 
excluded evidence that they do know. We may treat a human being in a 
permanent vegetative state, or a newborn, as if they were persons.  
 My suggestion is that we treat those of our intellectual commitments 
subject to reasonable disagreement as fictions. Whereas Vaihinger asserts 
that fictions are imaginative representations that are known to be false or 
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impossible, it seems that a weaker characterization captures what is essen-
tial; that fictions are imaginative representations not intended to correspond 
with reality (but where a possible correspondence with reality is not “from 
the start, excluded”). A good example here is free-will; an ideation that it 
seems can be consciously employed as a fiction in much juridical and eth-
ical practice and reasoning whilst deliberately not taking a stand on the 
question of whether free-will as a metaphysical hypothesis is known to be 
false or impossible, or even true.  
 Conciliationism does not advise us to believe that our intellectual com-
mitments are false. But it does give us grounds for not believing them and 
(with the addition of the pessimistic induction) for anticipating that we will 
not be able to justifiably believe them for the foreseeable future. The con-
sciousness of this seems enough to sustain us in the practice of relating to 
our intellectual commitments as fictions rather than as hypotheses: images 
of how it is useful to think about the world regardless of what the world is 
really like. Note that relating to one’s intellectual commitments as fictions 
does not completely foreclose the possibility that it may at some time be-
come legitimate to regard these intellectual commitments as hypotheses, 
but it offers an alternative way of relating to them until such a time may 
come. For example, we might imagine someone who undergoes an intel-
lectual journey in which they first relate to the idea of God as a hypothesis 
(“Since there is evil, God does not exist”), then as a fiction (“It is good to 
act as if God exists”, “Investigate nature as if it were an orderly produc-
tion”), then as a hypothesis again (“I’ve reconsidered the ontological argu-
ment – God exists!”). We might denote these different ways of relating to 
an intellectual commitment with a subscripted h or f, e.g. Godh or Godf. 
4. Solutions to the three criticisms of conciliationism 
 I now explain how treating our intellectual commitments as fictions ra-
ther than beliefs resolves the three noted criticisms.  
 The key point pertaining to all three criticisms is to note a difference 
between beliefs and fictions in the manner of their justification. Because 
beliefs are intended as claims about reality then, out of a set of mutually 
contradictory beliefs, only one belief about some matter can be true. One 
is justified in holding a given belief rather than one of its competitors by 
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the evidence one has. And, typically, evidence counting for one belief is 
evidence against its competitors. For instance, evidence that supports the 
belief “Elvis is alive” counts against the belief “Elvis is dead.” This is to 
say that beliefs are “rivalrous” – they compete for the justificatory resource 
of evidence (like rival gold-mining crews) and for one belief to become 
better justified by the discovery of new evidence typically means a depre-
ciation in the justificatory value of the evidence for another belief (like the 
devaluation one such crew may inflict on another by finding the mother 
lode). In the case of apparently reasonable disagreement, that someone 
meeting (i) and (ii) holds different beliefs than oneself functions, according 
to the conciliationist, as a piece of evidence against one’s own beliefs. By 
contrast, fictions do not make claims about reality and fictions are justified 
by their expediency not by any relation they bear to evidence. Whereas 
only one belief out of a set of mutually contradictory beliefs can be the best 
(the true), there seems to be no reason for assuming that there must be one 
fiction which is uniquely the best (the most expedient) in every respect and 
every context. Again, that one belief has had a lot of evidence adduced for 
it tends to show that it is the best (the true), but that some fiction has proven 
expedient does not tend to show that it is the best (the most expedient). In 
this way, fictions that are justified by expediency are “non-rivalrous.” That 
someone employs a different fiction to the fiction that I employ, and does 
so to great effect, does not by itself show that my fiction is inexpedient. 
Concretely, if one political scientist investigates political institutions using 
a model that treats politicians as if their only motivation was to hold office 
and finds this fiction to be very expedient (in generating testable hypothe-
ses, directing new research, etc.), this does not show that some other fiction 
would be inexpedient, e.g. a model that treats politicians as if their only 
motivation was to make money. By contrast, the more evidence ascertained 
for the belief that the only motivation of politicians is to hold office, the 
less reasonable it becomes to hold competing beliefs.  
 I anticipate that two difficulties will be raised. First, whilst the great 
expediency of one fiction may not act to “defeat” whatever expediency an-
other fiction may have, and does not provide grounds for refusing to try-
out some new fiction, it does provide prima facie reason to shift from em-
ploying some less expedient fiction to employing the more expedient fiction. 
Concretely, there may be some expediency to a Marxist approach to political 
economy, but there is perhaps greater expediency in a neo-classical approach 
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to political economy. Even if the expediency of the one does not detract 
from or destroy the expediency of the other, one ought to employ the latter. 
As Vaihinger himself remarked; “Expediency not only determines the ac-
ceptance or rejection of a particular fiction but also its selection from 
among others” (Vaihinger 1935, 90). Second, it seems that epistemic 
peers may reasonably disagree in their beliefs about which fictions it is 
most expedient to employ, leading to adoxicism about this question, 
meaning that they will have to suspend judgment about which fiction to 
employ, meaning that the dispiriting effect of conciliationism has not really 
been avoided.  
 In response to both these difficulties, note a distinction between the 
monolithic and the ecological expediency of a fiction. The former refers to 
what the most expedient fiction is when considered in isolation, i.e. a sce-
nario in which the intellectual community had to collectively choose to 
adopt one approach to political economy or the other. The latter refers to 
what the most expedient combination of fictions for an intellectual com-
munity might be, i.e. whether it is more expedient that everyone agree on 
one approach to political economy, or whether it is better that several ap-
proaches are employed – and if so which approaches. The two noted diffi-
culties are only difficulties for the monolithic expediency of a fiction. In 
the ecological sense of expediency, that someone else’s use of a fiction has 
proved very fruitful for their research does not always provide one with a 
reason to shift to employing that fiction. For instance, a particularly expe-
dient fiction may have attracted numerous researchers, such that one’s net 
input to the intellectual enterprise is greater if one focuses on what is an 
overall less expedient but underutilized fiction; for instance, one might de-
liberately adopt a strange cousin of rational choice theory rather than ra-
tional choice theory itself. Or again, one may have a different purpose in 
mind for which some other fiction may be more expedient. Regarding the 
second difficulty, that many people are locked in apparently reasonable 
disagreements about which the most expedient fiction is in the monolithic 
sense (“Which theory is the best”), although it does provide grounds for 
doxastic revision about this question, it does not provide reason for hesi-
tating in the selection of a fiction, since it is generally not true that expedi-
ency will be maximized by everyone employing the same fictions. Whilst 
there are numerous benefits to a shared paradigm (related to as a fiction or 
not), it is expedient that people choose to employ different fictions, even 
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ones which we may regard as unpromising. For instance, economics is 
plausibly a more progressive discipline because of the coexistence of Aus-
trianism, Keynesianism, Behavioralism, etc., and the struggles between 
them than it would be if every researcher held the same intellectual com-
mitments. Reasonable people can be aware of this, and so will not view 
differences in belief about which fictions it is most expedient to employ as 
a reason for indecision in employing a given fiction; any one of a number 
of fictions will remain reasonable options. Indeed, one may have nothing 
more than subjective grounds for employing a fiction (“it seems plausible 
to me,” “it seems like a good approach”), or arbitrarily adopt a fiction on a 
volitional basis, but nevertheless find expediency in employing it. 
 This is not to say that the selection of any fiction in any circumstance 
will be expedient in the ecological sense. Even taking into account the syn-
ergy that results from allowing different forms of thought to flourish, com-
pete, and cross-pollinate, certain fictions are so evidently inexpedient (or 
may become so with the passage of time) that one would reasonably regard 
someone who selected them as no longer being a peer, e.g., a political sci-
entist who investigates political institutions using a fictional model that 
treats politicians as if their only motivation was to acquire letterheaded pa-
per. On an analogy with Feyerabend’s epistemological anarchism (Feyera-
bend 1975), we might call this view “fictional minarchism.” The conditions 
under which it becomes expedient to begin employing some fiction or other 
can likely not be put in a general formula, and if they could it would be an 
extremely difficult to ascertain when such conditions obtained as an em-
pirical matter. No doubt practical wisdom is called for. For instance, I 
would hazard that there is ecological expediency in the existence of small 
groups of creationists, phrenologists, mercantilists, and Steady State theo-
rists, if only insofar as they inadvertently help clarify the commitments of 
researchers within the mainstream paradigms. 
4.1. Pessimistic induction 
 Fictionalization of our intellectual commitments means that they avoid 
the pessimistic induction. Since fictions are not assertions about reality, it 
is no objection that previous intellectual commitments turned out to be 
false. Again, since fictions are justified by their expediency rather than any 
relation they bear to evidence, that intellectual commitments past, present, 
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and future, have a weighty piece of second order evidence going against 
them is not a relevant ground for the revision of one’s fictions.  
 A different sort of pessimistic induction, grounded in the general in-
expediency of many or most past fictions might give one reason to expect 
that one’s fictions will prove inexpedient. Since expediency is a compar-
ative concept only an observation of a trend of decline in the expediency 
of fictions employed would give one reason for doubting the expediency 
of one’s own. But I take it that the real historical record of philosophy 
and the social sciences does not support this; whether our intellectual 
commitments in this area have proven expedient at all may be question-
able, but the case for a gradual degeneration in their expediency seems 
hard to make.  
4.2. Self-defeat 
 Conciliationism, as originally conceived, as well as being an epistemo-
logical or methodological claim about what we ought to believe under con-
ditions of apparently reasonable disagreement, is itself offered as an object 
of belief. Such a conciliationismh is indeed self-defeating. But we can also 
endorse conciliationismf, a fiction that concerns the most expedient way of 
relating to one’s intellectual commitments under conditions of apparently 
reasonable disagreement. Conciliationismf could be characterized as “treat-
ing apparently reasonable disagreements as if they provide reason for con-
ciliation.” That others endorse steadfasth or steadfastf (“treating apparently 
reasonable disagreements as if they provide no reason for conciliation”) is 
now not a reason for someone who endorses conciliationismf to conciliate 
about conciliationismf; since the differences in approach between the two 
fictions are not a disagreement of theoretical reason but a difference in 
practical reason conciliationismf is not self-defeating.  
 The question then might seem to be whether conciliationismf or stead-
fastf, or something else, is the most expedient fiction. Here, it might seem 
that steadfastf is the most expedient fiction; continuing along as if “I am 
right and others are wrong.” Steadfastf allows one to practically ignore the 
dispiriting conclusion of the pessimistic induction. Moreover, it might at 
first seem that conciliationismf is a very inexpedient fiction, since it advises 
detaching from all of one’s intellectual commitments, as if they were all, 
and would remain, subject to a weighty piece of undercutting evidence. 
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Although these characterizations of steadfastf and conciliationismf seem 
right, attempting to figure out which approach is the better and then adopt-
ing it is misconceived, given the previous remarks about ecological expe-
diency. There is therefore likely to be room in the intellectual community 
for personalities who adopt either steadfastf or conciliationismf, and there 
is call for an individual switching between them depending on the inquiry 
being pursued. Judgments about when it is best to adopt either of these 
fictions about one’s intellectual commitments are no doubt difficult and 
highly contextual. At any rate, the self-defeat objection to conciliationismh 
is avoided by its fictionalized analogue.  
4.3. Revisionary 
 Conciliationismf is not a hypothesis to be believed, but a fiction. It 
therefore makes no attempt to be consistent with the evidence one has for 
one’s favored theories or with the evidence of intuition. Rather, to cite these 
things as grounds for not endorsing conciliationismf would be a category 
error, because fictions draw their justification from their expediency not 
from any relation they bear to evidence.  
 Having outlined my resolution of these criticisms, I now address five 
objections, in part as a clarificatory exercise.  
5. Objections answered 
5.1. “People believe their intellectual commitments and don’t  
treat them as fictions. People cannot think like that.” 
 I take it that the first sentence of this claim is for the most part de-
scriptively accurate, but not worrying. The second sentence of this claim 
would be worrying if it is true. If it is true, fictionalization of our intel-
lectual commitments would remain justified in principle. But there would 
be an “ought implies can” problem, and a certain frivolousness, in rec-
ommending that people think in a way that they are unable to think. In 
response, I would suggest that it is descriptively more precise to say that 
people cannot relate to their intellectual commitments as fictions all or 
most of the time, rather than that people are unable to do so at all. In this 
respect, there are many philosophical companions in guilt; skepticism 
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about causation, solipsism, and so forth, can only be sustained with effort 
for a short time before by “a kind of laziness…I happily slide into old 
opinions” (Descartes 1996, 15). The same difficulty seems to attend con-
ciliationism itself, so in this respect my suggestion is no worse off than 
the view from which it departs.  
 It seems that the psychological possibility worry can also be addressed 
by pointing to numerous cases of philosophers and other inquirers explic-
itly treating very important elements of their thought as fictions; Thomas 
Hobbes’ state of nature (Hobbes 1998, 85), John Rawls’ veil of ignorance 
(Rawls 1999, 118-123), David Hume’s account of justice and property 
(Hume 2007, 316-317), Edward Craig’s account of knowledge (Craig 
1991), Bernard Williams’ account of truthfulness (Williams 2002, 20-22), 
Friedrich Forberg on God, freedom, and immortality (Forberg 2010), the 
models of economists, the rational choice theory employed in political sci-
ence, the domestic analogy of international relations, teleology in biology, 
the legal treatment of rivers as persons, etc., each of which is likely to out-
rage or bemuse any undergraduate who mistakes them as hypotheses to be 
believed.  
 Further, although it seems most inquirers hold firm beliefs about their 
area of inquiry, much of the language they use suggests otherwise. One 
often hears an academic refer to their ideations as “projects,” “research 
programs,” or “orientations” (Hayek 1955, 225), which may “work out” 
or allow one to “tell that story” or “make that move.” Much intellectual 
activity might comfortably and charitably be reinterpreted as fictive. For 
instance, a Marxist anthropologist might say “When I examine a society 
previously unknown to me, I do so as if each feature of its religion, mo-
rality, and law, was explained principally by the society’s mode of pro-
duction.” One thing they might be doing is employing Marxism as a hy-
pothesis to explain this society, and also seeing if Marxism as a hypoth-
esis is falsified by the evidence this new society gives. But another thing 
they might be doing is self-consciously treating Marxism as an entirely 
unfalsifiable fiction that is expedient at gaining certain insights into this 
society or organizing inquiry about it. We are accustomed to condemning 
the Marxist anthropologist’s claim for being unfalsifiable, but the real 
ground of its condemnation might be its inexpediency (if it is inexpedi-
ent).  
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5.2. “If we think of our ideations as fictions, we will stop  
caring about them.” 
 Given the examples related above and the controversies that have 
raged over them, I think this objection prima facie fails, even if it is hard 
to explain why. Those inquirers engaged in explicitly fictive thinking  
are not aiming to write fantasy novels. Rather, the aim of fictive thinking 
is expedience, in terms of both practical activity and in terms of the or-
ganization of thought and the direction of inquiry. Therefore, fictions 
have a connection with both the use of theoretical reason and practical 
reason. This means that they engage our interest in both the true and the 
good, though at a certain remove from the immediacy of either belief or 
action.  
5.3. “Why not ‘acceptance’ or ‘supposition’ instead of fiction?” 
 Any propositional attitude that is a “hypothesis” in Vaihinger’s sense, 
something that affirms something about reality (such as knowledge, opin-
ion) or is intended as a tentative or hopeful precursor of an affirmation 
(such as acceptance, supposition), is subject to a parallel of conciliation-
ism. If disputants have apparently reasonable disagreements in their opin-
ions or suppositions, or over which claims to accept, this likewise acts as 
a second order piece of evidence undercutting whatever evidence sup-
ported the differing opinions or suppositions or acceptances. That Co-
lumbo and Poirot have different opinions or suppositions (rather than be-
liefs) about whodunit is good reason for both to revise their opinions and 
suppositions about the matter. Acceptances are more akin to fictions in 
that they are objects of volition (Cohen 1992, 22). Yet whilst it seems 
justifiable to adopt one of a number of different acceptances in adverse 
epistemic conditions, doing so is not justifiable as epistemic conditions 
improve; acceptances are therefore sensitive to evidence in a way that 
fictions are not. For instance, it seems justifiable for one physicist to ac-
cept one version of string theory, and for another physicist to accept some 
other version of string theory, as temporary propositions. But it is not 
justifiable for a contemporary physicist to accept in this way Newtonian 
physics, whereas it remains very expedient to take it up as a fiction in 
many contexts. 
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5.4. “In terms of ecological expediency, are there not also  
circumstances in which it is essential that everyone is  
guided by the same fictions? e.g. that we all employ  
the fiction of free will.” 
 When speaking about expediency, I have been speaking principally 
about the expediency regarding the advancement of intellectual under-
standing. The example of juridical punishment is one in which we aim at 
something more concretely practical, where it seems true that we must all 
converge on the same fiction. But since fictions are non-rivalrous and are 
justified by expediency, there is no problem with our employing one fiction 
at one time or context and another fiction at another time or context de-
pending on the purpose in hand. For instance, a judge qua judge will act 
and think as if the convict was free in committing their crime and merits a 
certain punishment. Such a fiction is part and parcel of the role of judge 
and the practice of juridical punishment. But the same judge might be quite 
committed to determinismf when as a prudential agent he has to decide 
which part of the city to reside in.  
5.5. “When I say ‘I believe God exists’ or ‘I believe abortion is  
murder’ I am stating my beliefs. I do not mean ‘I think and act  
as if God exists,’ and I refuse to mean this. Your suggestion is  
unacceptable regarding matters such as religion and morality.” 
 One response to this objection is to aver that many of one’s epistemic 
peers do not believe that God exists or that abortion is murder, and that the 
objector ought to fictionalize their religious and moral commitments. But 
two other responses can be made, each of which avoids the demand for 
fictionalization. A first is that religious and moral beliefs are not founded 
on evidence at all. Whilst such a response might raise questions about 
whether religious and moral beliefs ought to be held at all, it indicates that 
disagreements about religion and morality are not apparently reasonable. 
If the beliefs of A are not based on the reasoned consideration of a body of 
evidence, and B is aware of this, then the fact that A endorses certain beliefs 
provides no undercutting defeater of B’s beliefs. Second, one might ques-
tion whether the commitments of religion and morality are best character-
ized in terms of belief. For example, many philosophers who are by no 
 C O N C I L I A T I O N I S M  A N D  F I C T I O N A L I S M  471 
means hostile to religious faith have characterized it as being something 
other than a species of belief. For Kant, faith is a practical mode of convic-
tion distinct from theoretical knowledge and opinion (Wood 1970, 17-25). 
Robert Audi describes faith as a cognitive attitude separate from belief, and 
one which is “epistemically less at risk, in the sense that it is less easily 
defeated, than rational belief” (Audi 1991, 219). Going further, Schellen-
berg claims that belief and faith are incompatible (Schellenberg 2005, 127-
166), whilst for Schleiermacher faith is a feeling rather than a cognition 
(Schleiermacher 1893). Similar claims can be made about some (but by no 
means all) metaethical views; familiar kinds of non-cognitivism would 
plausibly avoid the need for conciliation and fictionalization, as would 
(more arguably) certain varieties of constructivism, intuitionism, and moral 
sentimentalism.  
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